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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Johnny Wayne Phelps appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury 
verdict finding him guilty of felony domestic battery. Phelps claims error in 
relation to the district court's ruling that the victim's recorded statements, made 
shortly after the incident, were admissible. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Phelps battered his girlfriend, Robyn Marshall, by headbutting her, hitting 
her in the mouth, grabbing her throat, and pushing her head into a mirror several 
times. (Tr., p.142, L.6 - p.146, L.12.) Robyn sustained several injuries as a 
result, including a black eye, a bloody lip, a cut behind her ear, bruises, and an 
"abrasion" and "goose egg" on her head. (Tr., p.143, L.8 - p.144, L.24, p.146, 
L.9, p.150, Ls.11-20, p.246, Ls.18-24, p.256, L.19 - p.257, L.3; Exhibits 1-13.) 
The state charged Phelps with felony domestic battery. (R., pp.14-15, 38-
39.) Prior to trial, the state filed a motion in limine seeking admission of "the 
Watchguard video recording provided by the responding Spirit Lake Police 
Officer, Daniel Koontz, obtained upon his initial contact with the victim." (R., 
p.64.) The state proffered several exceptions to the hearsay rule in support of its 
request to admit the video. (R., pp.64-65; Tr., p.94, L.12 - p.104, L.10, p.109, 
L.19 - p.111, L.16.) Phelps objected. (R., pp.77-80; Tr., p.104, L.13 - p.109, 
L.16.) The court deferred ruling until it had the opportunity to hear the 
foundational evidence presented at trial, but ultimately admitted the video. (Tr., 
p.111, L.21 - p.116, L.5, p.188, L.11 - p.192, L.24.) 
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The jury found Phelps guilty and the court imposed a unified four-year 
sentence with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and placed Phelps 




Phelps states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion by admitting hearsay 
statements contained in a videotaped interview? 
(Appellant's Brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Phelps failed to show the district court committed error, much less reversible 




Phelps Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Reversible Error, In The District 
Court's Determination That The Victim's Recorded Statements Were Admissible 
A. Introduction 
Phelps asserts the district court abused its discretion "in admitting the 
hearsay statements contained in the videotaped interview of [Robyn] Marshall."1 
(Appellant's Brief, p.5.) Application of the correct legal standards shows Phelps 
has failed to meet his burden of showing reversible error in the district court's 
evidentiary ruling regarding the admission of the videotape. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The trial court has broad discretion in the admission of evidence, and its 
judgment will be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion. 
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010) (citations omitted). 
With respect to the admission of hearsay, the appellate court determines 
"whether the district court recognized that it did not have discretion to admit the 
hearsay evidence if the requirements for an exception were not met; whether it 
acted consistently with the rules governing hearsay exceptions; and whether it 
reached its decision to admit the hearsay by an exercise of reason." State v. 
Watkins, 148 Idaho 418,423, 224 P.3d 485,490 (2009). 
1 Phelps' arguments only relate to Robyn's statements on the video, not any of 
the statements by other individuals included on the recording. (See generally 
Appellant's Brief, pp.5-16.) 
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C. Phelps' Hearsay Arguments Do Not Entitle Him To Reversal Of His 
Convictions 
Phelps claims the district court abused its discretion in allowing the 
admission of the video that was admitted as Exhibit 13 because, he contends, 
the statements Robyn made on the video were hearsay that did not qualify for 
admission under any of the proffered exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-16.) Phelps is incorrect. 
Officer Koontz, who recorded the video about which Phelps complains, 
began the recording after responding to the 911 call made by the bartender at 
the bar where Robyn fled after Phelps battered her. (Tr., p.185, Ls.10-19; 
Exhibit 13.) Officer Koontz testified the bar is a block away from the police 
department and that two minutes elapsed between the time dispatch received 
the call to the time he left the police department and it was "[n]ot even a minute 
or so" until he arrived at the bar.2 (Tr., p.180, Ls.13-22.) According to Robyn, 
Officer Koontz arrived approximately five minutes after she fled from Phelps. 
(Tr., p.149, Ls.12-15.) Three emergency medical personnel and another officer 
2 In his brief, Phelps writes: "Officer Koontz testified that the call came in to 
police dispatch at 9:18 p.m. [sic], and he was dispatched from the police station 
at 9:28 [sic] p.m." (Appellant's Brief, p.10.) It is clear from the next question and 
answer, however, that the "19:28" is an error in the transcript. The prosecutor's 
next question was, "Okay. So two minutes from the time that dispatch received 
the call, to the time that you left the police department?" (Tr., p.183, Ls.16-18 
(emphasis added).) Officer Koontz answered: "Right." (Tr., p.183, L.19.) That 
the dispatch time was 19:20 as opposed to 19:28 is consistent with Officer 
Koontz's report. (R., p.9 (noting Officer Koontz responded at "1920 hours")). 
Thus, to the extent Phelps is counting the time lapse as including an additional 
eight minutes, he is incorrect. 
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also arrived on scene and are on the video; the emergency medical personnel 
appear 25 seconds into the recording. (Tr., p.182, Ls.7-11; Exhibit 13.) The 
video captures conversations between the officers and Robyn, the emergency 
medical personnel and Robyn, and the officers and the emergency medical 
pesonnel. (See generally Exhibit 13.) In addition to revealing Robyn's 
statements shortly after the battery, the video also shows Robyn's appearance 
and demeanor following the battery. (Id.) 
In her pretrial motion in limine, the prosectuor referenced the following 
hearsay exceptions in relation to the video: ( 1) I. R. E. 803( 1) - present sense 
impression; (2) I.RE. 803(2) - excited utterance; (3) I.RE. 803(3) - then existing 
mental, emotional, or physical condition; and (4) I.RE. 803(4) - statements for 
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. (R, pp.64-65.) At the hearing on 
the state's motion, the prosecutor also relied on I.RE. 803(24) - the "catchall 
exception" to the hearsay rule. (Tr., p.94, L.12 - p.97, L.21.) 
Phelps did not object to any particular statements, but objected to 
admission of the video in its entirety, arguing "[t]his recording is not admissible 
under": (1) "I.RE. 803(1) (Present sense impression)" because "the statements 
[Robyn] made on the recording are made after any event causing injury 
occurred"; (2) "I.RE. 803(2) (excited utterance) as the statements by [Robyn] 
were not made under the stress and excitement of the event"; (3) "I.RE. 803(3) 
(then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition) as the recording [sic] was 
not made to law enforcement contemporaneously with the event in question"; or 
(4) "I.RE. 803(4) ([s]tatements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment) 
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because the statements were not made for the purpose of medical diagnosis and 
treatment." (R., pp.77-79.) Phelps also argued the "admission of the recording 
in trial [was] cumulative, duplicative, and violates the Confrontation Clause."3 
(R., p.79.) 
In addressing the state's motion prior to trial, the court noted that not all of 
the statements "fit under the scope of all the exceptions ... argued by the state" 
and observed: "I think some of the statements may very well fall under some of 
the exceptions; some of the statements may not fall under the exceptions. And 
so one size does not fit all here in terms of ruling on the admissibility of the 
video." (Tr., p.111, L.21 - p.112, L.4.) The court elaborated: 
Present-sense impression, for example, I think clearly when Ms. 
Marshall is stating, especially when it's an unsolicited statement, 
that, oh, my God that hurts or this hurts, those kinds of statements, 
I think, are very clearly present-sense impressions. 
She's obviously experiencing some pain and she's making 
an exclamation as to the fact that she's enduring some pain. 
That's a present-sense impression. 
The fact that she's explaining an event that occurred five 
minutes earlier at a house or wherever - whatever residence she 
may have been, I don't think that really falls under the exception of 
a present-sense impression. Now, it might be excited utterance, 
because as the state has indicated, I don't think that there's 
anything magical about two minutes, five minutes, even half an 
hour. It all depends upon the specific facts. 
Present-sense impression, I think, has to be while the 
declarant is perceiving the event or condition or immediately 
thereafter. 
3 Phelps later withdrew his Confrontation Clause objection. (Tr., p.109, Ls.1-6.) 
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So, basically, I don't make [sic] -- the Court's in a position 
right now to rule on the admissibility of the video because I think 
the admissibility of the video, as both of you highlighted in your 
arguments, is very dependent upon the foundation. We need to 
know what happened in terms of these injuries or this physical 
condition that Ms. Marshall was complaining about and explaining 
to the officers and the EMTs. We also have to know the time 
sequence, the circumstances that led from the incident to the report 
and to the response from law enforcement and EMTs. We need to 
learn what level, if any, of intoxication that the -- Ms. Marshall was 
under. 
(Tr., p.113, L.3 - p.114, L.20.) The court, therefore, deferred ruling until after the 
state laid foundation. (Tr., p.116, Ls.2-5.) 
Following Robyn's testimony and a portion of Officer Koontz's direct 
examination, the state moved for admission of Exhibit 13. (Tr., p.188, Ls.12-15.) 
At that time, the court ruled the video was admissible. (Tr., p.189, L.11 - p.192, 
L.24.) 
On appeal, Phelps does not identify any particular statements he believes 
were inadmissible.4 (See generally Appellant's Brief, pp.5-16.) Instead, Phelps 
essentially challenges the admissibility of the video in its entirety without 
discussing whether any one statement or statements qualifies under any 
particular exception. Phelps' all or nothing argument fails because, as explained 
below, the exceptions cited by the state, and referenced by the district court, 
were properly applied to a number of Robyn's statements. This Court should 
4 While Phelps discusses Robyn's statement on the video that she thought 
Phelps needed to be arrested and go to jail and her statement that she "didn't do 
[any]thing wrong," he does so only in the context of a broader argument that 
these particular statements were self-serving, not spontaneous or 
"contemporaneous with the event," and revealed a "motive for fabrication." 
(Appellant's Brief, pp.11, 13.) 
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decline to parse through the statements in light of Phelps' failure to demonstrate 
error in the admission of any specific statements. See Akers v. D.L. White 
Const., Inc., 156 Idaho 37, 320 P.3d 428 (2014) (quotations and citations 
omitted) ("[T]his Court does not search the record for error, and the party alleging 
error has the burden of showing it in the record."). 
A review of the video shows that many, if not all, of Robyn's statements 
were admissible under various exceptions to the hearsay rule. 
1. The Excited Utterance Exception 
"Although I.RE. 802 provides that hearsay evidence is generally 
inadmissible, much hearsay evidence is admissible under the exceptions 
provided by I.RE. 803 and 804." Watkins, 148 Idaho at 423, 224 P.3d at 490. 
Excited utterances are one such exception. I.RE. 803(2). 
Rule 803(2) provides that "[a] statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant is under the stress of excitement caused by 
the event or condition" is "not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the 
declarant is available as a witness." The excited utterance exception "has two 
requirements: (1) an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render 
inoperative the normal reflective thought process of an observer; and (2) the 
statement of the declarant must have been a spontaneous reaction to the 
occurrence or event and not the result of reflective thought." State v. Field, 144 
Idaho 559, 568, 165 P.3d 273, 282 (2007) (citations omitted). In deciding 
whether a statement satisfies this exception, the Court considers the totality of 
the circumstances including "the lapse of time between the startling occurrence 
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or event and the statement, the nature of the occurrence or event, the condition 
of the declarant, the presence or absence of self-interest when the statement 
was made, and whether the statement was volunteered or made in response to a 
question." State v. Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 564, 300 P.3d 1046, 1052 (2013) 
(citation omitted). 
With respect to this exception, the district court stated, in part: 
[l]t seems to me that the distances between the 
apartment where the defendant and Ms. Marshall were residing, 
the Linger Longer bar, were just a matter of a few feet, if you will. 
The police station was just minutes away. The call from the Linger 
Longer went out almost immediately. By the time the officer was 
on the scene and recording the video, Ms. Marshall had been 
subjected to what I think clearly qualifies as a startling event. 
(Tr., p.191, Ls.4-12.) 
Phelps argues "the hearsay statements were not excited utterances as 
they were made well over 10 minutes after the incident, they were made in 
response to police questioning, and Ms. Marshall had substantial time to reflect 
and come to the conclusion that she wanted to see Mr. Phelps prosecuted." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6.) As noted, Phelps does not identify any particular 
statements for this Court to consider in order to apply the factors relevant to 
deciding whether any specific statement qualified as an excited utterance. 
Notwithstanding Phelps' implication to the contrary, some of Robyn's statements 
were properly admitted as excited utterances. 
With respect to the lapse of time, it is well-established that "there is no 
bright line rule regarding the lapse of time between the stressful event and the 
making of a statement to be admissible as an excited utterance." State v. 
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Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 733, 240 P.3d 575, 579 (2010) (brackets, quotations 
and citations omitted). Phelps' blanket assertion that Robyn's statements "were 
made well over 10 minutes after the incident" is untrue. (Appellant's Brief, p.6.) 
The first question that can be heard5 was by one of the officers who asked, 
"about when did that happen?" (Exhibit 13, 00:11.) Robyn, who can be heard 
crying and can be seen with blood running down her face, answered: "About five 
minutes ago." (Exhibit 13, 00:12.) She then said, "He beat the shit out of me 
and nothin' wrong, I didn't do anything wrong. I found his jacket. I wore it. I 
gave it back to him."6 (Exhibit 13, 00: 12-00:28) These statements were made 
within minutes of the startling event, while Robyn was clearly upset and reacting 
to being beaten, and while the officer asked when it happened, her statements 
about what happened were not in response to any question,. Cf. Thorngren, 149 
Idaho at 734, 240 P.3d at 580 (noting the question asking "what's wrong" "was 
not specific or leading, and because [the] response was brief and made while 
emotionally unsettled, the statement does not lack spontaneity or bear other 
indicia of reflective thought"). These statements could be properly admitted as 
excited utterances. The Supreme Court's opinion in Parton, 154 Idaho 558, 300 
P.3d 1046, is instructive. 
5 It is apparent that some conversation occurred prior to the recording being 
activated but there is no evidence as to the length of the delay (see Tr., p.187, 
L.17 - p.188, L.11 (foundational questions related to video)); however, 
considering the evidence related to response times and when the incident 
occurred, it appears the delay was very minimal. 
6 Portions of the audio on Exhibit 13 are difficult to understand; the quoted 
statements reflect the state's best effort at representing what was said. 
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In Parton, "two patrol officers working the night shift were taking a short 
break at a police substation" "[o]n a cold October night at about 3:00 a.m." 
Parton, 154 Idaho at 560, 300 P.3d at 1048. While inside, one officer heard a 
knocking sound but thought it was from the ventilation system. kl After the 
second knock, the officers went to investigate, and opened the back door where 
they "saw a 40-year-old woman curled up in a fetal position on the ground. She 
was dressed only in a tee-shirt and jeans and was not wearing shoes. She was 
very upset and crying and appeared to be injured and in pain." kl "They asked, 
'Are you okay?," and the woman answered, '"I need help. My boyfriend beat me 
up."' kl The woman's statements were admitted as excited utterances. Parton, 
154 Idaho at 563-564, 300 P.3d at 1051-1052. 
On appeal, Parton claimed the district court erred in admitting his victim's 
statements. kl The Court noted that "[t]he district court considered the following 
factors": 
About twenty minutes elapsed between the startling event (her 
boyfriend battering her to the point that she was afraid he would kill 
her) to her making the statement to the police. When the officers 
found her, she was on the ground in a fetal position crying. She did 
not take time to put on her shoes when she fled, indicating how 
afraid she was. When the officers found her, they did not ask, 
"What happened." They asked, "Are you okay?" The woman's 
statement that her boyfriend beat her up was not made in response 
to a question designed to incriminate anyone by her response. 
Parton, 154 Idaho at 564, 300 P.3d at 1052. The Court rejected Parton's 
arguments that the district court erred in admitting, as excited utterances, the 
statements Parton's victim made upon being found by law enforcement. kl at 
564-565, 300 P.3d at 1052-1053. In doing so, the Court noted that, on appeal, it 
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does not "reweigh the facts to determine whether the statement fits within the 
classification of an excited utterance"; rather, the "issue on appeal is whether the 
district court abused its discretion." kl at 565, 300 P.3d at 1053. As in Parton, 
Phelps has failed to show error in the admission of some of Robyn's statements 
under the excited utterance exception.7 See also State v. Hoover, 138 Idaho 
414, 417, 419-420, 64 P.3d 340, 344, 345-346 (Ct. App. 2003) (upholding 
admission of statements made by victim to security guard when the guard found 
the victim "lying in a fetal position in a pool of blood in the snow-hysterical, 
shaking and crying, with her face actively bleeding"; victim responded that 
"Hoover had beaten her" and evidence showed her "injuries had transpired very 
shortly before she made her statements"). 
2. Present Sense Impression And Then Existing Mental, Emotional, Or 
Physical Condition Exceptions 
During the video, Robyn makes numerous statements regarding the pain 
she is experiencing, where it hurts, and the fact that she is "scared." (Exhibit 13 
at 00:52 ("I'm scared"), 00:53 ("I'm scared"), 00:57-01 :00 ("my ear hurts, my ear 
hurts really bad"), 01 :48-01 :51 ("It hurts when I talk, it hurts when I talk right 
there"), 03:37 ("I'm scared"), 03:49 ("Ouch that hurts"), 03:58 ("That hurts, too"), 
04:32-04:34 ("hurts really bad," "I'm gonna get a fat lip"), 04:50 ("I'm cold"), 
7 The state does not take the position that all of Robyn's statements are excited 
utterances. As noted by the district court, not all of the exceptions offered by the 
state "apply across the board to all of those statements." (Tr., p.190, Ls.2-4.) 
But, because Phelps has not analyzed the admissibility of any specific 
statements, the state can only provide examples of where the various exceptions 
can be properly applied. 
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04:54-5:01 ("My face hurts. My ear hurts. And when I talk it hurts, too. I don't 
like that part."), 05:39 ("that hurts"), 05:59 ("God that hurts"), 06:36 ("Ouch! That 
hurts!"), 06:57 ("Ouch, that hurts!"), 07:04 ("I don't feel good"), 07:11 ("Ow, that 
hurts!"), 07:18-07:19 ("Ow! Ow! Ow!"), 07:36 ("big lip, that sucks"), 09:47-09:52 
("It hurts. It hurts when I breathe. It hurts when I talk. And, I can feel it. It 
hurts."). The statements were properly admitted under either the present sense 
impression exception or the exception for "then existing mental, emotional, or 
physical condition." I.R.E. 803(1), 803(3). 
A present sense impression is an exception to the hearsay rule and is 
defined as a "statement describing or explaining an event or condition made 
while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition, or immediately 
thereafter." I.R.E. 803(1). Rule of Evidence 803(3) provides for the admission of 
Statement[s] of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, 
sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, 
design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a 
statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or 
believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, 
or terms of declarant's will. 
Phelps claims neither of the foregoing exceptions apply. With respect to 
the present sense impression exception, Phelps argues the exception is 
inapplicable because "the statements were not made while Ms. Marshall was 
experiencing the incident, but were made approximately fifteen to twenty-five 
minutes after the incident, in a different location." (Appellant's Brief, p.12.) 
Again, because Phelps does not identify what statements he is referring to, it is 
difficult to evaluate his claim. It appears that Phelps is attempting to relate 
Robyn's statements regarding her pain and fear back to the battery. While the 
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two are obviously connected, it is clear that Robyn's statements regarding pain 
and fear relate to the fact that she was experiencing both of those sensations 
and emotions at the time she made the statements. Phelps' contrary claim lacks 
merit. 
As for the exception for "then existing mental, emotional, or physical 
condition," Phelps contends "the majority of Ms. Marshall's videotaped 
statements recalled past events, and were not describing a then existing 
condition." Again, Phelps does not identify any statements in particular and 
Robyn's statements regarding pain and fear were not based on "past events," 
but were based on what was happening at the time of the video. Indeed, several 
of her responses regarding pain were in direct response to the examination 
being conducted by EMT Jason Kelly. Phelps' assertion that none of Robyn's 
statements qualified as exceptions under I. R. E. 803(3) fail. 
Because several of Robyn's statements were properly admitted under 
l.R.E. 803(1) and 803(3),8 Phelps has failed to show error in their admission. 
3. Statements For Purposes Of Medical Diagnosis Or Treatment 
"Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and 
describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or 
the source thereof' are admissible "insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis 
8 Even if it is unclear from the record that this was the basis for the district court's 
decision to admit those specific statements, this Court can affirm based on 
application of the proper exception. State v. Woodbury, 127 Idaho 757, 760, 905 
P.2d 1066, 1069 (Ct. App. 1995) ("Where a ruling in a criminal case is correct, 
thought based upon an incorrect reason, it still may be sustained under the 
proper reason."). 
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or treatment." I.R.E. 803(4). Robyn's statements regarding the pain she was 
experiencing and where it was located also qualified for admission under this 
exception. Her statements regarding the source of her injuries were also 
properly admitted pursuant to I.R.E. 803(4). For example, early in the video, 
EMT Kelly asked Robyn: "Where did he hit you? What did he hit you with? His 
Hands? Anything else? How many times?" (Exhibit 13, 00:31-00:38.) It 
appears most of Robyn's responses were non-verbal until, after EMT Kelly's last 
question, Robyn said, "The mirror is shattered in the bathroom." (Exhibit 13, 
00:39.) 
Later Robyn also tells EMT Kelly, "I can feel it right here." (Exhibit 13, 
01:19-01:20.) EMT Kelly then asks, "Did he hit you with his hand is what he hit 
you with?" and Robyn answers, "Yeah, he hit me in the mouth." (Exhibit 13, 
01 :23-01 :27.) Toward the end of the video, there is also a discussion between 
EMT Kelly and Robyn regarding what Robyn would like the EMTs to do for her 
and whether she wanted to be transported to the hospital. (Exhibit 13, 09:26-
09:52.) Robyn's statements in response to these questions were "reasonably 
pertinent" to Robyn's medical treatment. As such, these statements, along with 
Robyn's other statements relating to her condition and the source of her injuries 
were properly admitted under I.R.E. 803(4). 
Phelps' claim to the contrary is: "The questions Ms. Marshall was 
responding to were the questions of the police officer, not the medical care 
providers. She was not describing to the EMTs at the scene how she came by 
her injuries, but instead was responding to a police officer's questions regarding 
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the incident." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Because this claim is belied by the 
record, it fails. 
Phelps has failed to show that some of Robyn's statements were 
admissible under I.R.E. 803(4). 
4. The "Catch-All" Exception 
Phelps' final argument is that Robyn's statements "were not admissible 
under I.R.E. 803(24) as they did not contain the circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness." (Appellant's Brief, p.14.) Because many of Robyn's 
statements were properly admitted under other exceptions, the Court need not 
conduct an analysis under I.R.E. 803(24) for any of those statements. And, of 
course, the need to engage in an 1.R.E. 803(24) analysis is dependent on 
whether the Court is willing to parse through all of Robyn's statements in the first 
instance. To the extent the Court does so, the state submits that some of 
Robyn's statements could also be admitted under I.R.E. 803(24). 
"I.R.E. 803(24) serves as a residual hearsay exception." State v. 
Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 707, 864 P.2d 149, 153 (1993). In order to admit 
hearsay under this exception, the Court must find: 
(A) the hearsay statement has circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness equivalent to those in Rules 803(1) to 803(23), (B) 
the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact, (C) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than 
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through 
reasonable efforts, (D) the general purposes of the rules of 
evidence, and the interests of justice, will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence, and (E) the proponent 
gives the adverse party adequate notice and information regarding 
use of the statement. 
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Ransom, 124 Idaho at 708, 864 P.2d 149, 154 (citation omitted); see also State 
v. Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 696-698, 760 P.2d 27, 35-37 (1988) (discussing I.RE. 
803(24) factors). 
The prosecutor discussed these factors in detail at the hearing on the 
state's motion in limine. (Tr., p.94, L.12 - p.97, L.23.) Prior to admitting the 
video, the court commented that the "indicia of reliability that are also of concern 
in terms of these hearsay statements have been satisfied by the facts and the 
circumstances." (Tr., p.191, Ls.22-24.) 
On appeal, Phelps contends none of Robyn's statements qualified under 
the I.RE. 803(24) exception, claiming "the requisite guarantees of 
trustworthiness were not present," the "statements were not made 
spontaneously," and at one point Robyn indicated she thought Phelps should be 
arrested and taken to jail, which Phelps argues indicates a "motive for 
fabrication." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Obviously the "requisite guarantees of 
trustworthiness" were present for any statement that qualified for admission 
under another exception. See Ransom, 124 Idaho at 708, 864 P.2d at 154 ("the 
hearsay statement [under I.RE. 803(24) must have] circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness equivalent to those in Rules 803(1) to 803(23)"). However, 
Robyn's statements later in the video regarding what happened, even if not 
considered excited utterances, were consistent with her excited utterances and 
statements to EMT Kelly such that they can also be said to have circumstantial 
guarantees of trustworthiness. (Compare Exhibit 13, 00:15-00:27 (Robyn stating 
"[h]e beat the shit out of me" and discussing jacket she found, wore, and gave 
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back to Phelps), 00:39 (Robyn commenting mirror was shattered) with 02:00-
02:08 (Robyn explaining Phelps pushed her into the mirror, hit her, and kicked 
her) and 02:39 (discussing finding jacket), 07:44-07:46 (discussing Phelps 
pushing her into mirror), 09:20 (discussing jacket).) See State v. Gray, 129 
Idaho 784, 792, 932 P.2d 907, 915 (Ct. App. 1997) (citing Idaho v. Wright, 497 
U.S. 805, 821-22 (1990)) ("The Supreme Court noted the spontaneity of the 
statement, the consistency of repetition, the mental state of the declarant and 
the lack of motive to fabricate as indicators of trustworthiness."). 
As for Robyn's request that Phelps "be arrested" and "go to jail" (Exhibit 
13, 09:59), which is one of the few statements Phelps actually refers to, contrary 
to Phelps' claim, these statements do not indicate a "motive for fabrication." 
(Appellant's Brief, p.15.) This is true for at least two reasons. First, the 
statements were made near the end of the video after Robyn already relayed the 
relevant information about what happened in statements that qualified for 
admission under other exceptions. Second, Phelps' claim of fabrication is 
severely undermined by Robyn's injuries, which were corroborated by her tearful 
and bloody appearance. 
Phelps also argues Robyn's "statements are not more probative on the 
point for which they were offered than could be procured through other means, 
because [she] could simply have been (and was) asked about what happened 
when she testified at trial." (Appellant's Brief, p.16.) As noted by the prosecutor, 
Robyn's appearance and statements right after the battery are more probative of 
what occurred because they were closer in time to the crime, which is also 
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relevant when considering the lapse between the battery and trial. (Tr., p.96, 
L.15 - p.97, L.2.) The district court also recognized that the statements by 
Robyn on the video "put[ ] them in the context of the heated circumstances," 
which was relevant in terms of the state's burden of proof. (Tr., p.190, Ls.16-
20.)9 
Because Phelps has failed to identify any particular error in the district 
court's ruling regarding the admissibility of the video, he is not entitled to relief. 
D. Even If Phelps Met His Burden Of Showing Error, Any Error Is Harmless 
Even if Phelps has met his burden of showing any error in the district 
court's evidentiary ruling, the error was harmless. Where evidence is 
erroneously admitted, the test for determining if the error was harmless is 
"'whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might 
have contributed to the conviction and that the court must be able to declare a 
belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' State v. Jones, 125 
Idaho 477, 488, 873 P.2d 122, 133 (1994) (quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 
742, 762, 810 P.2d 680, 700 (1991)); see also State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 
971, 976, 829 P.2d 861, 865 (1992) (quoting State v. Sharp, 101 Idaho 498, 507, 
616 P.2d 1034, 1043 (1980)) (to hold erroneous admission of evidence 
harmless, court must '"declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that there 
9 This Court may also very well conclude that some of Robyn's statements on 
the video were not hearsay if they were not offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted. See Gray, 129 Idaho at 791, 932 P.2d at 914 (citations omitted) ("The 
first inquiry must be whether the statements were hearsay, that is, whether they 
were out-of-court statements offered as an assertion of proof of the matters 
asserted therein."). 
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was no reasonable possibility that [the] evidence complained of contributed to 
the conviction"') (brackets original). The State has the burden of demonstrating 
that an objected-to error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Perry, 
150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d 961, 974 (2010). 
As Phelps acknowledges, much of what was seen and heard on the video 
was also seen and heard by the jury as a result of Robyn's testimony and the 
admission of pictures reflecting her injuries. (Appellant's Brief, p.16; see 
generally Tr., pp.130-173); Exhibits 1-13.) This makes any error in the 
admission of similar evidence harmless. See,~ Woodbury, 127 Idaho at 761, 
905 P .2d at 1070 (noting in its harmless error analysis that the challenged 
testimony was "notably repetitive" to unchallenged testimony). In addition, the 
physical evidence corroborated Robyn's version of events as well as Robyn's 
injuries. (Tr., p.208, Ls.9-18.) This fact also supports a finding of harmless 
error. See Gray, 129 Idaho at 792, 932 P.2d at 915 (citations omitted) ("The 
existence of corroborating evidence may indicate that any error in the admission 
of a statement was harmless, but is not an appropriate consideration in finding a 
statement was trustworthy."). 
Finally, Phelps used some of the inconsistencies between Robyn's trial 
testimony and what she told, and did not tell, law enforcement during the video 
recording in an effort to impeach her at trial. (See generally Tr., pp.168-171.) 
"[O]ut-of-court statement[s] offered to impeach a witness's credibility [are] not 
hearsay." Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 304, 900 P.2d 201, 212 (Ct. App. 
1995). Surely Phelps would have pursued these same lines of impeachment 
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even if the state had not requested admission of Exhibit 13, and the state would 
have been able to offer any consistent prior statement by Robyn to rebut Phelps' 
claim "of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive." I.R.E. 801 (d)(1 )(B). 
For the foregoing reasons, even if this Court concludes the district court 
erred in admitting any of Robyn's recorded statements, any error was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment entered 
upon the jury verdict finding Phelps guilty of felony domestic battery. 
DATED this 2nd day of December 2014. 
Deputy Attorney General 
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